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Abstract. In this article I intend to give more attention to Pufendorf’s ideas than has been the
custom among international relations theorists. The main focus will be upon Pufendorf ’s
distillation and conceptualization of the implications of Westphalia in terms of sovereignty
and the integrity of states. Furthermore, his extension of the Aristotelian classification of
types of state, and his attempts to go beyond Bodin’s and Hobbes’s theories of sovereignty,
provide the vocabulary and concepts in terms of which the different international actors of
the late seventeenth century could be understood. In this respect the focus is altogether
different from Linklater. My emphasis upon the historical and emblematic character of the
Peace of Westphalia, the personification of the state and its animation by sovereignty, which
serves to facilitate Pufendorf ’s exploration of the idea of a system of states, and my
suggestion that his ideas are not wholly redundant and may be used to explore some facets of
a modern states system, serve considerably to extend Forsyth’s brief analysis.
Samuel von Pufendorf was one of the most famous moral and political philosophers
of his day providing an authoritative reference point in terms of which theorists
addressed the major contemporary controversies.2 His contribution as one of the
leading theorists of international law was acknowledged by the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace in the early part of this century with the translation and
publication of his major works on natural law. With the demise of liberal international-
ism during the inter-war period, the prospect of Pufendorf becoming a central figure
in the study of international relations considerably receded. He has, in fact, been
almost completely ignored by contemporary international relations theorists.3 He
has not even merited inclusion in the immensely wide-ranging anthologies that have
recently been published.4
There are some texts on international relations that acknowledge Pufendorf ’s
importance by merely making passing reference to his conclusions without giving his
reasons for reaching them. Martin Wight acknowledges that it was Pufendorf who
coined the term ‘systems of states’ which serves as the title for his own book. Wight
simply gives Pufendorf’s definition: ‘several states that are connected as to seem to
constitute one body but whose members retain sovereignty’. Wight wrongly suggests
that it was later writers who distinguished this concept into unions between states
and confederations.5 Elsewhere Pufendorf is cited in relation to uscapation, the right
by which continuous use confers property rights upon a possessor against a known
former owner, and in the context of distinguishing between a truce and a peace.6
Terry Nardin cryptically asserts, in passing asides, Pufendorf ’s importance in
relation to the idea of an international society; the formal equality of states; the idea
of a states system; and, the denial that international law is law properly understood.7
Nicholas Onuf similarly makes passing reference to the importance of Pufendorf.
He suggests, for example, that Pufendorf makes the simple but incredibly modern
point that states must be sovereign in order to be states.8 Onuf also claims that
Pufendorf ’s On the Law of Nature and Nations is to be counted among those
treatises on the law of nature that are ‘nothing but catalogues of duties proclaimed
on behalf of nature’.9 This is a considerable distortion of Pufendorf ’s enterprise
because it is not the duties themselves which are interesting, but the arguments by
which Pufendorf arrives at them. The fact that he contends that American Indians,
for example, have rights and duties in respect of their lands even though there are no
signs of occupancy, such as demarcation and cultivation, is a mere assertion without
the argument to sustain it. In distinguishing between private property and ‘eminent
domain’ he not only restricts the grounds on which colonial expansionism can be
justified, but also provides the justificatory argument for the integrity of territorial
sovereignty. Eminent domain, he argues, is the right of communities, including
states, over the property of its members or citizens. The implication of this is that
irrespective of whether one takes the American Indians to be living in a state of
nature, as Grotius and Locke do, they are still to be understood as exercising the
property right of ‘occupancy as a whole’ and determining its use and distribution by
title of eminent domain.10
Of the secondary sources on classic international theory Andrew Linklater’s Men
and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, and Murray Forsyth’s Unions
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of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation are notable exceptions in giving
Pufendorf a prominent place.11 On the assumption that our obligations to fellow
human beings ought to trump those of our obligations as citizens—although there is
no necessary reason for them to be incompatible—Linklater condemns Pufendorf
for failing to remain faithful to his principles of natural law in giving priority to the
rights of citizens. Pufendorf is not so much recommending a desired and wished-for
state of affairs, the state of affairs that Linklater desires, namely, a worldwide moral
community that supersedes the modern states system, but instead he attempts to
theorize the international arena as it emerges from the Peace of Westphalia. It is
anachronistic to think that Pufendorf could and should have superseded in his
theoretical explorations something that no theorist had yet more than partially
understood. His achievement was, in fact, to develop our conceptual vocabulary in a
way that could accommodate and capture what was happening at the international
level in his day. In other words, Pufendorf ’s main concern was trying to theorize
what was rather than what ought to be, what confronted him, rather than what it
might yet become. This, I think, is something that Murray Forsyth recognizes. For
him Pufendorf is important because he recognized that political formations such as
the Swiss Confederation, The United Provinces and the German Empire did not
conform to the received conception of a sovereign state, and yet appeared to go
beyond conventional leagues and alliances which characterized much of the
international relations of his day.
Historians of philosophy and political thought, in contrast with international
relations theorists in general, have recognized Pufendorf’s importance as an adept
synthesizer of the central ideas of Grotius and Hobbes. Pufendorf has been identi-
fied as central to the natural jurisprudence of the Scottish enlightenment12 and to
the development of the doctrines of natural law and natural rights. In particular,
and of considerable importance for understanding the Westphalian system of
international relations, he made original contributions to the development of social
contract theory, and the theory of property.13
In this article I intend to give much more serious attention to Pufendorf’s ideas
than has become customary from international relations theorists. The main focus of
this article will be upon Pufendorf’s distillation and conceptualization of the impli-
Resurrecting Pufendorf 559
11 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, 2nd edn. (London:
Macmillan, 1990), and Murray Forsyth, Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1981). In addition, Charles Beitz devotes three pages to
Pufendorf in his Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1979).
12 See, for example, Knud Haakonssen, ‘Hugo Grotius and the History of Political Thought’, Political
Theory, 13 (1985); Knud Haakonssen, ‘Natural Law and Moral Realism: The Scottish Synthesis’,
Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); T. Mautner,
‘Pufendorf and 18th century Scottish Philosophy’, in K. A. Modéer  (ed.), Samuel von Pufendorf
1632–1982 (Lund: Bloms Boktryckeri, 1986).
13 See, for example, Michael Lessnoff (ed.), Social Contract Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); Stephen
Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991);
Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979), and Robert Wokler, ‘Rousseau’s Pufendorf: Natural Law and the
Foundations of Commercial Society’, History of Political Thought, XV (1994).
cations of Westpahalia in terms of sovereignty and the integrity of states.14
Furthermore, his extension of the Aristotelian classification of types of state, and
his attempts to go beyond Bodin’s and Hobbes’s theories of sovereignty, provide the
vocabulary and concepts in terms of which the different international actors of the
late seventeenth century could be understood. In this respect the focus is altogether
different from Linklater. My emphasis upon the historical and emblematic character
of the Peace of Westphalia, the personification of the state and its animation by
sovereignty, which serves to facilitate Pufendorf’s exploration of the idea of a system
of states, and my suggestion that his ideas are not wholly redundant and may be
used to explore some facets of a modern states system, serve considerably to extend
Forsyth’s brief analysis.
The historical and emblematic
In the terms of reference of international political theory, if the Westphalian model
signifies anything it does so in no greater degree than in legitimating the priority of
community rights, such as those of the state, over those of the individual. The
universal rights and duties of the individual under natural law become more
precisely conceived as qualified by and mediated through the state as itself a
personality possessing rights and duties of its own, and to which obligations are
owed. The formal recognition of the notional autonomy and equality of numerous
political entities was a further landmark in the process of state formation and the
conceptualization of the state as an abstract entity independent of the private
person of the monarch or ruler, and the elevation of the subject to the status of
citizen, which was to find its quintessential expression in Rousseau’s Social Contract.
The issue of what duties may be owed to one’s fellow citizens, and to the state, and
which may be owed to humanity as a whole, while certainly preceding Westphalia,
came into sharper focus in the post-Westphalian world.
Here we need to be mindful of the distinction to be made between the language
and terms of the treaties themselves and what politically they came to signify. The
common view is that Westphalia represents the occasion when states agree to accept
constraints on their behaviour out of enlightened rational self-interest, the signi-
ficance of which is the belief that for the first time sovereignty becomes formally
recognized.
The contemporary international relations system so revolves around the idea of
sovereignty that a whole series of related settled norms have become common
currency among nations, such as the associated ideas of territorial integrity and the
principle of non-intervention. Despite the fact that states systematically violate these
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norms, to the extent that Stephen Krasner calls it ‘organised hypocrisy’,15 they
nevertheless act as constraints. The test of the existence of such norms as moral
constraints is that when states are in breach of them they feel compelled to give a
justification, or that when they violate them states do so clandestinely.16 Such a
strong commitment to the norm of sovereignty and the autonomy of the state has
understandably led modern writers on international relations, so thoroughly
immersed in the practical relevance of their discipline, to engage in what Herbert
Butterfield has called Whig history, the tendency to look at the past through the
wrong end of the telescope. In international relations theory the Peace of Westphalia
has become emblematic of the rise and formal recognition of sovereignty and the
emergence of a society of European states. David Held, for example, contends that
the Peace of Westphalia ‘entrenched, for the first time, the principle of territorial
sovereignty in inter-state affairs’.17 Alexander B. Murphy claims that the treaties ‘did
embody an early formalisation of the idea that sovereignty was not simply a charac-
teristic of individual states, but was also a principle that should govern relations
between states’.18 In addition, Michael Sheenan contends that it ‘formally recog-
nized the concept of state sovereignty’.19 At the same time sovereignty was not seen
as incompatible with compliance with international law, nor with a general recog-
nition of a collective common good. In Hedley Bull’s view, Westphalia signifies not
the emergence of an international state system, but instead the emergence of an
international society comprised of states.20
In this respect the past is didactic, having a practical purpose as a shorthand
justification of the modern states-system, or as a convenient caricature of a defining
moment in the past. Such events, invoked for their practical purpose in contem-
porary politics, are, to quote Michael Oakeshott: ‘abstracted from record in a
reading which divests them of their contingent circumstances and their authentic
utterance; symbolic and stereotypic personae, actions, exploits and situations’.21
Such events or persons are on permanent loan to the present as symbols emblematic
of all the vices and virtues of humanity.
The historical character of the Peace of Westphalia is, of course, quite different
and extremely more complex than its emblematic character. It reflected the interests
of its architects, France, Sweden and Holland, in attempting to diminish the
universalist authority of the Papacy and the Holy Roman and Spanish empires of
the Hapsburgs, who now became formally equal, at least juridically, with established
and emergent states. The participants were not conscious of establishing a new
system or state-centred international society, indeed they were of the view that the
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settlement should re-establish the status quo that prevailed before the Thirty Years
War.
The issue of sovereignty serves adequately to illustrate the difference between the
emblematic and the historical characters of the Peace of Westphalia. The legal
concept of sovereignty, however, although widely discussed among political theorists
for more than a century before the Peace, was not central to the negotiations. Only
in Spain’s recognition of the United Provinces could sovereignty be read into the
treatises. Instead the non-legal idea of autonomy dominated thinking in relation to
the aspirations of states, both for the self-determination of the states within the
German Empire, as well as for the well-established major states of Europe. The
German principalities, for example, claimed their autonomy as a matter of ancient
right.
To understand its historical identity, the Peace should not be viewed from present
preconceptions about sovereignty. A more fruitful avenue is to see it in terms of the
complex relations that pertained between the different political units in the Empire.
During the later medieval period the Emperor was de jure sovereign, but some cities,
such as Florence, were de facto sovereign. In addition, there were cities which were
autonomous, having negotiated or had conferred upon them certain liberties.22 At
the close of the later medieval period small urban elites came to the view that some
political territories were relatively free from the authority relations that prevailed
elsewhere, and more and more city-states in Northern Italy and Flanders claimed the
right of self-determination in specific spheres of activity.23 In other words the
relations among the multifarious communities remained complex and what was
acknowledged in the Peace of Westphalia was their autonomy in certain spheres of
action.24 Westphalia acknowledged the territorial autonomy of the states which
comprised the Empire and conceded their right to make treatises with each other
and with states outside the Empire on condition that such alliances were not
directed against the Emperor or the Empire. The Peace essentially acknowledges the
political and theoretical developments in the emergence of the modern state. The
state had gradually come to claim a monopoly over declarations of war and peace,
diplomatic representation and the making of treatises with foreign powers.25
What the Peace of Westphalia did in reality was to bring to the fore conceptual
issues that the political philosopher was compelled to address. It is the contention of
this article that many of the intimations which have later come to characterize the
Westphalian model of states relations were conceptualized or captured in the
writings of the most influential and widely read moral philosopher of the late
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Samuel von Pufendorf. It was the varied
nature of the political units that comprised post-Westphalian Europe that required
analysis. His main theoretical preoccupation was not, unlike Grotius and Hobbes,
the re-establishment of order out of chaos, but instead with the problem that
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Westphalia raised to pre-eminence: the character and status of the political units,
and the different obligations of the person, both as a man and citizen, which for him
necessarily entailed issues of sovereignty.
Pufendorf’s immensely popular On the Duty of Man and Citizen (1673), whose
title reflects its preoccupation, became a standard text-book in moral philosophy for
nearly a century before Kant’s Copernican revolution.26 Pufendorf’s importance lies
in the fact that he recognized that a gulf had opened up between traditional
scholastic notions of natural law, and the naturalistic conception exemplified by
Hobbes. He tried to reconcile justice and utility by acknowledging the role of self-
interest without abandoning the idea of obligation and duty under the natural law.
Furthermore, Pufendorf’s work reflects more systematically than any thinker up to
his time the question of the collective rights of a community, and how they differ
from those of an individual. Contrary to the thinking of most natural law thinkers,
he gave greater priority to the rights of states. States, in his view, could regulate their
size by restricting immigration, regulate trade, and ultimately held the supreme title
to property in the realm. These aspects of his thought are most clearly expressed in
relation to discussions arising from the discovery of the New World and the
responsibilities of the European states under natural law and the law of nations to
the non-European peoples. We should not lose sight of the fact, then, that the
conceptual issues that Westphalia brought into focus were generated not only by the
practices of states in continental Europe, but also by the issues raised by territorial
expansion into the New World, which necessitated arriving at answers to complex
questions about the rights and duties of states in relation to each other both in a
European context, and in relation to their extra-European territories. Questions of
the moral conditions of property ownership—what constitutes a valid claim, and
what might be regarded as violations of the natural law and thus give rise to a just
cause of war, entailing such questions as justifiable appropriation and reparation—
were extensively discussed before Westphalia by such theorists as Vitoria and
Grotius, and continued to resonate in the writings of such theorists and jurists as
Locke, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel afterwards.
It is ironic that, in one of the few discussions available in English of Pufendorf’s
theory of state relations, his theoretical discussions of the constraints of natural law
on the behaviour of states are dismissed as idealist, and it is suggested that his real
contribution to understanding the behaviour of states is his formulation of the
doctrine of raison d’état, to be found in his books on history. In his historical
writings the universal ethical content of the natural law is almost totally eclipsed by
the principles of state necessity and state interest. So much so that Meinecke praises
Pufendorf as one of the great analysts of state interest and of reason of state,
dismissing his theoretical work as too abstract, divorced from history, and marred by
a reliance upon natural law that obstructs the emergence of genuine insights about
the special character of individual state formations.27 Notwithstanding Meinecke’s
view, in so far as Pufendorf presented an elaborate theory of the post-Westphalian
state system, he was, as one of his most recent editors has commented, ‘the first
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philosopher of modern politics’.28 He was also the first person to hold a chair in
natural law and the law of nations. For the century after his appointment at
Heidelberg in 1660 almost every German university followed its example. His
seminal tract, The Law of Nature and Nations, was the reference point for sub-
sequent discussions of international relations by such eminent thinkers as Christian
Wolff (1676–1756) and Emer Vattel (1714–1767).
The state of nature
Pufendorf’s experience of the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire, a disunited
German Empire and the devastation consequent upon the Thirty Years War led him,
like many of his contemporaries, to postulate a state of nature. The method of
reasoning he used was the same as that of Hobbes, the hypothetical resolutive
compositive method in which all extraneous secondary qualities are stripped away
and man is revealed in his true state. Pufendorf does not subscribe to Hobbes’s
extreme individualism, nor is his state of nature characterized by a war of all against
all. The principle of self-preservation does not absolve us of the obligations that the
natural law impels us to perform towards other people (Natural State of Men, ch. 9).
It is a social condition giving rise to congenital obligations to preserve and promote
sociality. By the term sociable Pufendorf means ‘an attitude of each man towards
every other man, by which each is understood to be bound to the other by kindness,
peace and love and therefore by a mutual obligation’ (Law of Nature, II, iii, 15).
From what we know of the human condition it follows that a fundamental law of
nature must be to cultivate our sociableness which in turn promotes peace to the
advantage of humanity. Self-preservation and the preservation of society, two
principles that were later to constitute for Locke our duty to God, were for
Pufendorf the fundamental laws of nature from which all others followed.29 For
Grotius our social duties essentially amount to respecting each others’ rights, and
particularly not to infringe property rights. Sociality for Pufendorf entails more than
the negative of desisting. This is an aspect of Pufendorf’s theory that James Tully
has misunderstood in suggesting that ‘Sociableness, for Pufendorf, as for Grotius, is
characterized essentially by the negative duty of respecting what belongs to
others’.30 In Pufendorf’s view it is insufficient merely to desist from causing harm. In
addition, Pufendorf maintains, we have a duty to promote and cultivate society. In
fact he emphasizes sociality over self-interest in maintaining that the fundamental
law of nature is, ‘every man ought to do as much as he can to cultivate and preserve
sociality’, which means actively to promote it (Duty, I, 3, 8 and I, 7, 1). The obliga-
tion to do so is congenital rather than adventitious, and therefore, for Pufendorf,
absolute (Duty, I, 6, 1).
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In addition we incur obligations and rights, such as those surrounding property,
as a result of agreement. These are adventitious obligations. Obligations in the state
of nature are imperfect because there is no supreme sovereign to enforce them, in
other words they are not sanctioned by civil law. The fact that the obligations are
imperfect make them no less morally obligatory than those perfect obligations
enforceable in civil law.
While retaining Grotius’s idea of natural sociality he wants to show that it is
subverted by human imperfections. Pufendorf maintains that his investigation takes
man as he finds him here and now ‘tinged with depravity’ (Natural State of Men,
ch. 3). The original condition of man is brutish, but soon he realizes that mutual
aid, the sharing of a common humanity, and being subject to the natural law, all
impel him towards co-operation (Natural State of Men, ch. 6). An examination of
the state of nature is supposed to impress upon the reader the need for civil society,
even if this means enduring some of the imperfections of demanding and unreason-
able rulers (Natural State of Men, ch. 23).
In opposition to Hobbes, Pufendorf argues that justice and injustice do not
depend upon sovereigns, but are defined by natural law and bind the consciences of
men (Law of Nature, VIII, i, 5). States, Pufendorf maintains, could never have been
formed by compact had not some notion of justice and injustice existed prior to the
institution of the state. What binding force could a pact have without the knowledge
that it is just to keep it and unjust to break it?
Why is it necessary to sub-divide the world into states in preference to establishing
a cosmopolitan global authority? Pufendorf ’s answer to this question reflects the
political realities of the jealously guarded newly established principle of the
autonomy of states, and the need to constrain their relations not only by a universal
moral code, which he was well aware could not be adequately enforced in the
absence of a common superior, but also by the justification of war as an instrument
of compliance. Far from preventing war, the Westphalian settlement provided
criteria for when it may legitimately be resorted to, and in this respect posited a
rudimentary form of balance which was designed to prevent a preponderance of
power being accumulated to the disadvantage of the rest of the states of Europe.
In Pufendorf’s view, the human condition is precarious because of the uncertain-
ties of the observance and enforcement of the precepts of natural law among a great
multitude of people. Self-preservation is best achieved by conformity to the laws of
nature, the enforcement of which becomes effective when backed by the power of
the state. Security is the principal motivation for converting social communities into
political states.31 States, although the creation of human will, are instituted by the
command of God ‘in so far as they serve as the means to the observance of natural
law’ (Law of Nature, VIII, iii, 2). What this implies is that we have an obligation to
God to institute political society so that we may better fulfil our natures as social
beings, protecting ourselves and actively protecting others. Consent obligates us to a
specific form of government and sovereign. This is ultimately the position that
Locke puts forward in the Second Treatise.
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In summary, our natural inclination towards peace is disturbed by the vast growth
in population, exacerbated by defects in human nature which lead many to disregard
the law of nature and render the condition uncertain and precarious for all. It is
impractical to unite the whole of such a vast multitude into one state because the
benefits gained by eliminating conflicts between nations would be lost by the
diminution of the power of the state authority to contain internal disputes. A
plurality of states, with contracts reflecting the diversity of mankind, is in
Pufendorf ’s view, the most effective form of security.33 The social contract, for
Pufendorf, institutes a political society in which the rights and duties of citizens are
supplemented with the rights and duties of the sovereign. They are not the same
rights and duties, but ‘peculiar rights’ and ‘possessions’ conferred upon the ‘highest
authority’ in whose hands the care of the state has been placed (Law of Nature, VII,
ii, 8–12: Duty, II, vi, 6–14).
The State as a moral person
At the time of the emergence of the modern state during the later medieval and
early modern period, theorists found it difficult to characterize this relatively new
entity in terms of the conceptual vocabulary available to them. In general the state
was viewed in terms of concepts derived from Roman Law, either as a societas or a
universitas. Both, however, were already heavily laden with connotations not entirely
appropriate to an autonomous state. A societas entailed a contractual relationship
between individuals, implying no corporate identity, and was the term used under
private law to designate a partnership. It implied no identity beyond that of the
individuals who comprised it. A societas was a partnership of individuals, each of
whom was deemed capable of suing and of being sued independently of the whole
which was itself devoid of corporate personality. A universitas, or corporation, on
the other hand, had conferred upon it a legal or fictitious personality. In this
capacity it could possess proprietary rights, but was not deemed to have a will, inten-
tions, nor cognitive capacities. Furthermore a fictitious personality implied a higher
legal authority to create it.34 It is one of Pufendorf’s major strengths that when an
available vocabulary inadequately captures what he sees to be the historical reality of
his time he is quite prepared to extend or abandon it in favour of different terms of
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reference. Hobbes had argued that as a result of the social compact an artificial
person is created, the embodiment of which was the person of the sovereign who in
some way ‘represented’ the people, exercising his will on their behalf. The sovereign
is the unity of the people.35 Pufendorf thought this depiction of the state a major
theoretical advance, but thought that Hobbes did not go far enough. Pufendorf
takes the further step of endowing the state with an individuality and personality
distinct from the people who institute it, and the person of the ruler who exercises its
authority. Moral entities are, for Pufendorf, individual persons or collections of
persons united by a moral bond. The former he calls simple and the latter composite
or compound ‘moral persons’ (Law of Nature, I, i, 12). A composite moral person is
deemed to have one will, irrespective of the number of individuals who comprise it,
and its actions are the actions of the whole body. Such entities may be endowed with
rights and duties that none of the individuals comprising them could claim in their
own right (Elements, I, DEF IV, 3).36 He maintains that:
in compound moral bodies something can be attributed to the body which cannot be
attributed to all the members, that is, to them taken individually, or to any one of the
individuals; and, therefore, the whole is an actual moral person distinct from the individual
members, to which a special will, as well as actions and rights, can be attributed, which do
not fall to the individuals (Law of Nature, VII, v, 5).
Furthermore, he argues that: ‘The subjection and entwining of wills entailed in the
social contract creates the state which is ‘the most powerful of moral societies and
persons’.37 Pufendorf is not here talking of a fictitious legal entity, but a real
autonomous moral person with the capacity to will, deliberate and pursue purposes.
The state has a personality and is the bearer of rights and duties. This ‘actual’ moral
person has a will and personality independent of those who comprise it. Pufendorf
was the first to apply the idea of the juristic moral person to the state and hence
made it subject to the moral law of nature. It became a commonplace among writers
on international relations to view the state as a moral person. His successors Wolff
and Vattel, for example, extended the idea to designate states the moral subjects of
the law of nations.38
Sovereignty and sovereign powers
The Peace of Westphalia inaugurated the widespread acceptance of the territorial
state.39 In using the language of autonomy the Peace of Westphalia avoids having to
enter into complex definitions of the different types of sovereignty which the various
agreements might entail. The implications of what autonomy might entail, however,
could not be avoided by political theorists. By 1576 Bodin had recognized the
importance of the principle of sovereignty to understanding modern politics. His
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theory further consolidated the trend towards establishing an abstract conception of
the state distinguished from the person of the ruler. In this respect sovereignty is
vested in the state and not in particular persons, and is undiminished by the passing
of a regime or prince. Furthermore, sovereignty is absolute, subject to the con-
straints of natural law, the constitutional arrangements in which it is embedded, and
the covenants entered into which are equally binding on all parties.40 Hobbes,
writing in the immediate aftermath of the Thirty Years War and the Civil War in
England, formulated an absolutist conception of sovereignty, equating justice and
law with the will of the sovereign, aimed at minimizing the religious and political
conflicts that had led to the collapse of civil society both on the continent and in
Britain.
John Hoffman has been a severe critic of the idea of sovereignty, initially
associating it inextricably with the state, but more recently he argues that the concept
of sovereignty is historically evolving, and is such an embedded feature of the
international landscape that it cannot be abandoned. It is so much part of the
architecture of modernity that it should be redesigned and extended rather than
abandoned. In order to overcome its inherent contradictions, however, it needs to be
extended by severing the commonly assumed relation to the state.41 Pufendorf is
certainly one of the theorists responsible for so firmly linking sovereignty with the
state, but he was well aware that the absolutist conception of it did not fit well with
the contingencies of historical reality. Unlike Hoffman, however, Pufendorf not only
wants to extend the terms of reference of sovereignty, suggesting that absolute
and limited conceptions of sovereignty are both species of the genus supreme
sovereignty, he also believes that the traditional classification of states needs to be
modified in such a way that the centrality of sovereignty is not obscured. Whereas
Hoffman wants to deconstruct the state, Pufendorf wants to construct a firmer
conception of it which bears the weight of the idea of supreme sovereignty.
In Pufendorf ’s view Hobbes fails adequately to acknowledge the distinction
between supreme and absolute sovereignty choosing instead to equate the two (Law
Of Nature, VII, vi, 13). Absolute sovereignty is a species of supreme sovereignty.
Absolute sovereignty he defines as: ‘the faculty of exercising every right on one’s
own judgement and choice’ (Law of Nature, VII, vi, 10), or that the king ‘has the
final decision on his own judgement in matters which concern the commonwealth’
(Law of Nature, VII, vi, 12). Certainly when reading his legalistic account of
sovereignty in which he talks of its supremacy, indivisibility and exclusivity, with its
holder being above the civil laws and accountable only to God, it appears that
Pufendorf allows of no constitutional constraints upon the exercise of sovereign
power (Law of Nature, VII, vi, 1–3). He nevertheless qualifies this initial impression
by suggesting that it is not incompatible with the nature of sovereignty that it
conform ‘to a certain manner of procedure’ (VII, vi, 7), in other words, that it may
be procedurally limited.
Supreme sovereignty, for Pufendorf, merely denotes that there is no superior or
equal authority in the state (Law of Nature, VII, vi, 10). Limited sovereignty, like
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Absolute, is a species of the genus and may be constrained by constitutional
arrangements regarding conformity to ‘certain basic laws’ (Law of Nature, VII, vi,
10),42 or in accordance with specified procedures, such as consultation with a senate
or council whose consent may be required (Law of Nature, VII, vi, 12). In equating
limited sovereignty with procedural constraints Pufendorf believes that the
supremacy of sovereignty is not undermined. The significance of his distinction
between absolute and limited supreme sovereignty, as we will see, is of immense
importance for his characterization of the principal actors in international relations.
Sovereignty is for Pufendorf the soul that animates the person of the state, but
although instituted by human will, it is not its creation, nor dependent upon it.
Sovereignty is consistent with nature in that it conforms with human sociality and
right reason in better facilitating obedience to natural law. God sanctions
sovereignty, but he does not confer it directly upon the rulers of states. He does so
through the instrument of the human will. Pufendorf is at once undermining the
doctrine of popular sovereignty without endorsing the divine right of kings (Law of
Nature, VII, iii, 1–5).43 Human beings acting in time perform God’s will by insti-
tuting arrangements suggested by right reason and consistent with the indubitable
data of their nature. Insofar as sovereignty is both human and Divine, and in order
to fulfil the purpose for which we associate and institute political society, it is in our
interests to hold ‘sacrosanct and inviolable’ the civil sovereign. It is, Pufendorf
argues, ‘in the highest interest of mankind that the royal power be held sacred and
free from the cavils of churlish men’ (Law of Nature, VII, viii, 1 and VII, ii, 9
respectively). For Pufendorf the state is sacrosanct in retaining for itself special
rights and duties that lesser moral persons do not have. The supreme sovereign
entrusted with the safety of the people is ultimately responsible for all good and evil
acts within the state (Law of Nature, VII, ix, 9).
Types of State
In placing such a high premium on sovereignty Pufendorf establishes the norm of
what he calls regular or perfect states which conform to the standard types of
democracy, aristocracy and monarchy. It is interesting that unlike philosophers from
classical times up to his own time Pufendorf does not think it necessary to extend
the traditional triadic categorization of states by re-labelling their corrupt forms
because neither the nature nor legitimate object of power are altered (Law of
Nature, VII, v, 11–14).44 Often the use of such terms as tyranny and oligarchy, he
argues, are no more than an expression of dislike for the form of government.
Pufendorf argues that sovereignty may be exercised well or badly, due either to a
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personal fault in the sovereign or sovereign body, or an institutional fault where the
laws or offices of government are ill suited to the people or inadequate to perform
the functions required of them (Duties, II, 8, 1–12). In this respect the corrupt forms
exhibited no new or distinctive political principles which merited further
categorization.
In contrast to the regular type he identifies the irregular or imperfect states. It is
in this respect that he feels it necessary to extend the traditional Aristotelian
categories because he believed them to be inadequate to conceptualize current
political realities. The contrast between regular and irregular states rests upon the
fact that only those of the former kind are ‘directed by a single soul, as it were, or, in
other words, that the supreme sovereignty, without division and opposition, is
exercised by one will in all the parts of the state’ (Law of Nature, VII, v, 2).
Regularity, then, is judged by the criterion of unified power.45 In irregular states
sovereignty is divided among its separate parts. It is clear that such an arrangement
compromises the principle of supreme sovereignty. He disapproves of irregular states
because they are inherently weak and unstable. In Pufendorf’s view an irregular state
is an ‘ill-adjusted and sickly body’ (Law of Nature, VII, iv, 14). The unity of such
political entities does not lie in ‘sovereignty which is the soul of the state’, but
instead depends by necessity on agreement among the separate parts. While not
wishing to deny an irregular form the title of state, he maintains that it does not
‘constitute a state properly so called but only a formless aggregate’, an aberration
that has departed from its pure form.46
Pufendorf’s important contribution, however, is for the first time to characterize
and provide a definition of a third type of international actor, such as the Swiss
Confederation and the United Provinces, that conforms to neither of his dis-
tinctions, and this is essentially a system of states, of which confederations are a
species. Confederations for Pufendorf are ‘close’ systems, in contrast to loose
systems which are based upon much weaker bonds than shared monarchy or
compact. All peoples are related through common origin and are subject to natural
law; other states may have a bond because of a common racial origin, language or
culture; and yet others may be closely tied as independent former colonies of a
mother country.47 Pufendorf describes close political units as ‘systems made up of
several perfect states, which, in the eyes of those who are not versed in these matters,
assume the false form of one state …’ (Law of Nature, VII, v, 7).
A system of states, strictly speaking, is a collection of regular states in which
supreme sovereignty is limited, without compromising their integrity as regular
states, by procedural agreements. It is here that his distinction between absolute and
limited supreme sovereignty is of particular importance. A system of states is one
where each has a special bond with the others, but nevertheless retains its own
supreme sovereignty. The combined strength of such a system may be regarded as
that of one state (Duties, II, 8, 13). There are two main species. First, several
separate states may be united, most commonly by marriage or inheritance, in
sharing the same monarch. This would be a personal union in the person of the
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monarch, but not necessarily a constitutional union. James VI of Scotland, for
example, succeeded Elizabeth I to become James I of England. It is in identifying
the second type that Pufendorf displays his particular insight. Here a system exists
when several states bind themselves together by ‘perpetual treaty’, usually motivated
by the desire to preserve their autonomy, but possessing insufficient power to protect
themselves against enemies. In such cases it is usually agreed that some aspect of
sovereignty is exercised with the consent of all, while all other aspects which are of
little or no interest to the others, are exercised at the discretion of the individual
states.
A treaty establishing such a system differs from simple treatises in that states
permanently intertwine for purposes of the common object of security, rather than
undertake to perform certain functions while retaining their complete autonomy.
Permanent agreements among states give rise to adventitious obligations, created by
mutual consent, and they are also imperfect because there is no supreme sovereign
above the system of states to enforce them. They are, nevertheless, no less morally
obligatory under the natural law than obligations attached to civil laws. Pufendorf
expresses the difference between permanent and simple treaties by contrasting a
typical clause from each type of agreement. He argues that: ‘For there is a great deal
of difference between “I will bring you aid in this war, and we shall consider in
concert how we shall attack the enemy”, and “No one of us who have entered this
society will exercise his right of peace and war, save with the common consent of
all”’ (Law of Nature, VII, v, 18). This is not to suggest that such systems of states
cannot dissolve. Confederates may voluntarily leave when they begin to view their
fellow confederates as a liability, or when internal wars are ignited. This is because
each of the separate states in a system of states retains supreme sovereignty.
The German Empire constituted a problem for political theorists and commen-
tators in that sovereignty proved difficult to locate. Pufendorf ’s theory served to
provide the extended vocabulary in terms of which this evolving political unit could
be discussed. Many theorists followed Bodin in acknowledging that it was a simple
form of state, that is, a regular state in Pufendorf ’s terminology, and disputed
whether it was a monarchy or aristocracy. Others broadly followed Althusius in
viewing the German Empire as a mixed state, or an irregular state in Pufendorf’s
vocabulary. Pufendorf was critical of both characterizations. Using the pseudonym
of Severus de Monzambano in order to avoid the charge of partisanship, he
published in 1664 his The Constitution of the German Empire which traced the
erosion of monarchical sovereignty and the emergence of an entity that came close
to being a confederation.
Westphalia, in sanctioning war as a legitimate instrument for maintaining
international agreements, for example in conceding the right of France and Sweden
to intervene if the Emperor reneged on his renunciation of imperial ambitions,
formalized the concept of a justifiable war. In recognizing the autonomy of most of
the small states of central Europe, Westphalia rendered the Emperor politically
impotent. The terms proscribed the Emperor making laws, raising taxes, recruiting
soldiers, declaring war and making peace treaties without the consent of each state
in the Empire.48 Furthermore, as Holzgrefe points out, in vesting the right of war in
the sovereign, Pufendorf’s denial of the right of war to subordinate magistrates also
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reflects his dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Peace of Westphalia for the
German Empire. The right to negotiate and enter upon treaties granted to the
different German territories licensed alliances with foreign powers and undermined
the unity of the whole.49 He was critical of the Peace of Westphalia for diminishing
the imperial power of the Emperor and weakening German unity by granting the
former territorial princes formal autonomy.
Unlike Bodin, Pufendorf did not think that sovereignty resided in the Imperial
Diet, nor did he think with Althusius that the Diet acted as a limitation on a
monarchical form of state. The Diet more closely resembled the councils found in
such confederations as the Swiss and the Dutch. The German Empire, he believed,
had gradually evolved from a monarchical form, not into an aristocratic or
democratic regular state, but into something more like an irregular state which bore
some resemblance to a confederation or system of states. The result, when he
initially tried to understand it, was something of a monstrosity, neither a sovereign
state, nor a confederate system of states with a common interest: ‘the very fact is
that in the Empire, the head and the limbs stand opposed to each other like two
hostile parties!’ 50 To achieve harmony in the Empire is as difficult and laborious as
tuning a harp, which despite the effort stays in tune for a short duration (Law of
Nature, VII, v, 15). What prevented the Empire being a confederation was the
somewhat anachronistic figure of the Emperor obstructing the constituent states
from exercising supreme sovereignty in relation to each other and to the Imperial
power.51 He was concerned that the German Empire become a political force again.
The process of degeneration from monarchy, in his view, was almost irreversible and
the regularity of the state could not be restored without the risk of major catas-
trophe.52 In order to avoid further deterioration he recommends that regular states
be established with well defined interests within a confederal system. If they found it
necessary to appoint a leader, then the powers apportioned should be strictly limited
by law and a representative council in order to avoid aspirations of sovereignty.53
Conclusion
The point to be emphasized is that even though states as moral persons inhabit a
state of nature, in the same way that individuals are said to have done prior to the
establishment of states, the laws of nature are equally as binding as those enforce-
able under civil law. Pufendorf posits a moral order that is universal, in which men
owe duties to each other by the mere fact of being human and by being subject to
God’s sovereignty.54 Despite the fact that these duties are qualified by our obliga-
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tions as citizens, Pufendorf ’s theory constitutes a rejection of the view that the
moral order is confined to the internal relations of the state, and between which
there can be no justice and injustice, or that any morality that may pertain between
states is merely a matter of convention. He is sensitive to the historical emergence of
the state and the complex relations which pertained among the very different actors
in the Westphalian system. He recognized that both the categorization of states, and
the conceptualization of sovereignty, had to be revised and extended to meet the
prevailing historical contingencies. At the same time he tried to reconcile the duty of
the state to protect its citizens with the universal claims of humanity. Conceiving the
state as a person inevitably generated its own logic of explanation and justification
of international conduct. Like the individual in the state of nature, but in reality
more self-sufficient, the state should regard others of its kind as ‘inconstant’ friends
who may presently become enemies. It should endeavour to live in peace, but also be
mindful that the law of nature is often an inadequate constraint upon those who are
no respecters of it.
His conclusions, especially those relating to sovereignty and the classification of
states, should not be viewed as merely of historical interest. The Westphalian model
in contemporary international relations theory is invariably characterized in terms of
absolute sovereignty, which essentially means complete self-determination. The fact
that for most states this is evidently not the case generates self-induced problems,
even to the extent of suggesting that sovereignty might be an outmoded concept in
the modern world. Sovereignty is a concept that has had to evolve to meet the needs
of historical circumstances. The example of Pufendorf clearly demonstrates a point
in time when the realities of the Westphalian system did not match the conceptual
vocabulary in which to understand them. He extended this vocabulary both in terms
of sovereignty and the classification of states, yet it is the more archaic meanings
and concepts that he rejected which are still employed. His discussion of supreme
sovereignty is certainly incomplete, and even somewhat evasive on crucial issues, but
nevertheless, in conjunction with the idea of a system of states, we are better able to
characterize such organizations as the European Union without getting embroiled in
the debates about state power and autonomy generated when seen from the
perspective of absolute sovereignty. Far from present day ambiguities in both the
concepts of the state and sovereignty demanding their abandonment, the fact that
they are deeply embedded in contemporary international relations, and are central to
discussions regarding further integration among members of the European Union,
requires that they are clarified and refined rather than abandoned.55 It is unlikely, for
example, that a British government in the foreseeable future could persuade the
electorate that sovereignty and statehood are no longer useful concepts when used in
relation to the European Union. A far more useful strategy would be to retain their
laudable evaluative connotations while extending their empirical references. To talk
of divided sovereignty among the member states and the Union itself is politically
divisive—sovereignty hived-off is sovereignty lost. But to argue that supreme
sovereignty is completely compatible with permanent agreements to comply with
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procedural and legal processes which require mutual co-operation for mutual benefit
is both politically and strategically more astute. It is the recognition that sovereignty
can be limited by agreement, and that the idea of absolute sovereignty is therefore
inapplicable, which makes collective decision-making compatible with supreme
sovereignty. To describe the European Union as a system of states, in Pufendorf’s
sense, requires that each member retain the right to pull out, and therefore, as we
saw, it is perfectly possible for systems of states to dissolve by voluntary withdrawal
if the confederation is viewed as more of a hindrance than a help (Law of Nations,
VII, v, 21).
Confederates may voluntarily leave when they begin to view their fellow con-
federates as a liability, or when internal wars are ignited. This is because each of the
separate states in a system of states retains supreme sovereignty.
Let us take the cases of European citizenship and human rights, for example, to
illustrate the extent to which discussion of European Union relations and human
rights are understood and conceptualized in terms of sovereignty, the nation and
statehood. Despite the fact that citizenship has taken on post-national dimensions in
Europe, and that rights traditionally grounded in the state are articulated at the level
of human rights, the sovereign nation state is still the reference point in which both
are enjoyed. European Citizenship depends upon the prior enjoyment of national
citizenship of a member state, and the enjoyment of human rights depends upon
their recognition, implementation, and enforcement by sovereign states. As Soysal
acknowledges, ‘the sovereign nation state retains the formally and organisationally
legitimate form venerated by the ideologies and conventions of transnational
reference groups such as the UN, UNESCO, European Union and the like’.56
Notwithstanding Linklater’s contention that a higher, more inclusive cosmo-
politan citizenship is intimated in European citizenship, citizenship, nationality and
the state are nevertheless currently inextricably linked.57 The Declaration on
Nationality of a Member State, incorporated into the Treaty on European Union,
unequivocally reaffirms the priority of national sovereignty over citizenship issues. It
states: ‘the question whether an individual possesses the nationality of a member
State shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the member State
concerned’.58 Nationality may be said to be the external aspect of citizenship. One’s
nationality determines to which state one belongs in the international context, and
citizenship determines what rights one enjoys as a consequence of holding one’s
nationality. The rights that non-citizens enjoy are not rights of citizenship, but rights
attached to a different status, which of course, vary according to the status one is
afforded. Nationality relates to what Northedge described as external sovereignty. A
state must be recognized for its nationals to have an international status. It is clear
that in this respect citizenship of the European Union does not correlate with
nationality of the Union, but with a member state. Does, then, the European Union
have the external sovereignty which is necessary for statehood and the ascription of
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European nationality? One of the essential features of the emergence of the modern
state has been the centralization of the power to make treatises and to be
represented at international bodies and organizations. This entails the capacity to
communicate with other governments in international law, fulfil international
obligations, and to make decisions within its territory that may affect other states, or
their nationals and companies.59 From the outset the European Union had the
power conferred upon it to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements with states
or international organizations, and this power was more strictly defined in the Treaty
on European Union (Maastrich). What is crucial, however, is that the power to act is
constrained by the terms of reference that the member states have agreed upon, and
its authority flows from the competencies conferred upon it in the context of the EC
Treaty and the acts of accession. Elspeth Guild has argued that in terms of
international law, the Community perceives itself to have an identity, and that the
‘member states, which have ceded sovereignty to permit the Community to acquire
such an identity, are under a duty not to undermine that identity so long as it is
limited to the objectives of the treaty’.60 Such a view of the community is perfectly
compatible with calling it a system of states in Pufendorf’s sense of the term. The
individual members are so closely linked that in many respects they appear to be one
body, but nevertheless retain sovereign autonomy except in those respects in which
they have agreed to act collectively. They are bound for these purposes by perpetual
treaties which empower the union to act within the terms of reference specified. No
sense of common identity, or common society is required above the basic cohesive-
ness of perceived common interest. Common interest is still very much the terms in
which the Union is perceived by member states. The good of the whole, or the
common good, is still very much subordinate to national interest, the terms in fact
which characterize the debate within Britain about the merits of adopting the
common currency. This is not to say that the Union cannot become more than it is,
a system of states constituted by perpetual treatises which provide the framework
for common action, and develop into a state with divided sovereignty dispersed
throughout the Union. It would, then, in Pufendorf ’s terms, be an irregular state
with all the problems that implied for him.
We are still a long way from superseding the Westphalian state system.
Sovereignty, citizenship and nationality were all amorphous and ambiguous
concepts from the beginning, gradually changing their character in conformity with
circumstances, and the fact that they continue to be fluid does not necessarily signal
the demise of the sovereign state. Ironically, Linklater’s optimism for the trans-
formation of sovereignty and citizenship becomes rather hollow when he cryptically
specifies the conditions of such a transformation: ‘The post-Westphalian era will
begin when societies act as cosmopolitan citizens who aspire to make progress
together towards the ethical ideal of a universal communication community’.61
Formal structures and legal frameworks do not a polity make! Democracy is
premised on the existence of a demos, in the case of the European Union many
peoples comprising one demos, as opposed to the current situation of many demoi,
one European people. It is generally agreed that a collective civic identity is missing,
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and that the European people do not perceive themselves as citizens in a wider
moral community. This is the socio-psychological dimension which a focus upon
structures and legal frameworks filters out. The differences on the issue of social
cohesion within the EU are a matter of degree rather than of kind.62 Pooling the
sovereignty of individual states does not dissolve sovereignty, it merely expands the
community to which it is applicable. It is simply a relocation of the exclusionary
discourse of the state on a greater scale. European Citizenship is designed to achieve
a greater inclusivity within the Union, but it is nevertheless at the expense of a
greater exclusivity in relation to outsiders because it requires member states to be
more stringent in their immigration policies. Because of the harmonization of visa
policies, for example, the UK is compelled to abandon its preferential treatment of
some Commonwealth countries by requiring their citizens to obtain entry visas.
Greater freedom of movement within the Union requires greater precision in
defining who is to enjoy this privilege, and far from breaking down the strong
correlation between citizenship and nationality, European citizenship is based on the
prior claim to nationality in a member state. Although the European Commission
was given extra powers under the Maastricht Treaty, its formal authority over
matters of immigration is minimal. No member state has publicly expressed a
willingness to cede it powers over immigration. There are vast differences in the
requirements for acquiring citizenship throughout the European Union, to the
extent that the issue has been described as the last bastion of sovereignty. In
questions of citizenship the freedom of state action has been far less eroded than in
other spheres of activity.63
Reconfiguring sovereignty, however, does not circumvent the inside/outside divide
associated with statehood, because the question that is still uppermost in the mind
of researchers is the extent to which the European Union has become a state by
exhibiting those very characteristics of sovereignty traditionally associated with
statehood. At a time when international relations theorists are highlighting the
transformation of international politics with the dissolution of sovereignty by the
advent and proliferation of non-governmental actors, one of the most prominent
features of the New Europe is the extent to which Western European governments
are developing new and more draconian measures of immigration control.64 Andrew
Geddes has shown, for example, that immigration control and the admittance of
asylum seekers at EU level have become much tougher. The freer movement of EU
citizens within Europe precipitated firmer control of external borders.65
It has recently been observed that nation-building traditionally correlated the
principles of nationality and rights within the very idea of citizenship, but of late the
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rights that were regarded as embedded in a community have become more abstract
and articulated at a general or universalistic level—the level of human rights—at the
same time as difference and identity have become rooted in particularistic com-
munities.66 This, of course, may be the case, but it ignores the pertinent point made
by Pufendorf and which has become part of modern rights theory and practice, and
that is rights, particularly those which are universal, such as those enshrined in the
natural law, in order to become effective have to be both recognized and enforced,
transforming them from imperfect rights whose enforcement is precarious, to perfect
rights enforceable by law. The recent Pinochet case and the existence of ad hoc
tribunals on war crimes and crimes against humanity testify to the importance of
Pufendorf ’s view. The ruling of the British Law Lords in March 1999 against
Augusto Pinochet is only one of many reminders of the fragile relation in which
hundreds of millions of people worldwide stand to their governments, upon which
they are dependent for the protection of their rights, but which nevertheless
systematically violate them. In ruling that Pinochet is not immune from prosecution
and can be extradited to Spain, the issue of where national sovereignty ends and
where international law begins has come sharply into focus. Notwithstanding the
collapse of the case on grounds of mental incapacity, the ruling acknowledges the
authority of a Spanish court to indict Pinochet for human rights violations,
including the torture and murder of his own citizens. The Law Lords ruled that
Pinochet could not be tried for crimes committed before 1988, the year that Britain
signed the UN Torture Convention incorporating such crimes into British law.67 The
ruling in fact reaffirmed the primacy of sovereignty over international law and
universal rights. In other words the existence of a right, a genuine claim, depends
upon recognition and enforcement by sovereign states, and in this respect they are
similar to civil laws. Such a view is confirmed by the Commission of Human Rights
in consistently disavowing competence to consider the business of, or decisions made
by, the Community’s institutions, because it is not a signatory to the Convention on
Human Rights.
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